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Standards setters support that purchase price allocations (PPAs) enhance financial statement 
decision-usefulness whereas academics and practitioners challenge this statement. We test the 
consequences of the quality of  PPAs, subsequent to business combinations, on change in 
market expectations. Using the concept of abnormal goodwill – as a proxy for PPAs’ quality – 
we  test  the  association  between  PPAs’  quality  and  analyst  forecasts  revisions,  change  in 
forecasts dispersion, and analysts’ accuracy of 200 major U.S. business combinations. We do 
not find evidence that PPAs’ quality have material impact on change in market expectations, 
suggesting  that  market  participants  fail  to  fully  integrate  information  content  of  PPAs. 
Consistently,  we  provide  evidence  that  PPAs’  quality  enables  to  generate  a  profitable 
investment strategy as cumulated abnormal returns can be systematically generated based on 
abnormal goodwill recognized in PPAs. 
Keywords: 
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1.  Introduction 
The  goal  of  financial  reporting  is  to  inform  users  about  the  true  economic  underlying  of 
earnings. Recent evolutions put forward by U.S. and international standard setters resulted in 
a major change in terms of business combination accounting treatment: the purchase price has 
to be allocated to identifiable tangible and intangible assets, such as corporate trademark, 
customer relationship or backlog in order to improve the usefulness of financial statements. 
The identification and valuation process of acquired tangible and intangible assets, namely 
purchase price allocation (PPA), implies that goodwill has to be considered only as a residual. 
However, there is still a case  for competing positions between  FASB/IASB and practical 
implementation  of  standards  provisions  relating  to  PPAs,  with  regard  to  earnings 
management.  The  FASB/IASB  position  is  not  completely  supported  by  academics  and 
practitioners,  as  they  expressed  concerns  relating  to  the  relevance  of  favoring  separate 
recognition of intangible assets from goodwill. 
These  concerns  are  related  to  usefulness  issues,  i.e.  the  allocation  of  goodwill  may  be 
managed, as well as quality issues, i.e. the information disclosed may be uninformative for 
investors. In this context, this paper is the first to examine: (1) if analysts really care about 
information disclosed in the acquirer’s purchase price  allocation; (2) if  the quality of the 
allocation is fully integrated into stock prices. 
Our  research  question  is  the  following:  to  what  extent  is  the  quality  of  purchase  price 
allocation, required by standard setters, useful to financial statement users? In other words, do 
PPAs improve financial statements’ usefulness for investors in making economic decisions 
with regard to capital allocation? 
Our  analysis  is  based  on  a  unique  hand  collected  dataset  from  acquirers’  annual  reports 
consisting in 241 major U.S. acquisitions, completed between 2002 and 2008. We focus first 
on assessing the quality of PPAs and second on testing the consequences of PPAs quality. Our 
results offer guidance for standard setters as we demonstrate that improving the quality of 
works undertaken to conduct PPAs, required by standards is not, by itself, sufficient to imply 
an increase of usefulness for users. As a result, we provide a major contribution to the current 
debate between academics and standard setters regarding the potential effects of accounting 









































Our research question raises a difficulty because the quality of work undertaken to allocate 
purchase prices on acquired net assets is not directly observable. Consequently, to address this 
issue, we implement a two-step approach. First, we estimate a proxy for the quality of the 
allocation of the purchase price following a business combination. This proxy is based on the 
notion of abnormal  goodwill, initially suggested by  Shalev  (2009). Abnormal  goodwill is 
defined as the portion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill differing from the expected 
amount, considering some key underlying economic factors (e.g., sector, performance, growth 
expectations).  Second,  we  test  the  effects  of  PPAs’s  quality  on  investors’  change  in 
expectations, defined as financial analysts (forecasts’ revisions, change in dispersion, change 
in accuracy), and market as a whole (cumulated abnormal returns). We further provide tests 
regarding the robustness of our approach to capture PPA’s’ quality. 
Our  results  suggest  that  the  quality  of  PPAs  has  no  strong  effect  on  change  in  market 
expectations. Analysts, like the market, do not pay much attention to the quality of PPAs 
disclosed by acquirers. However, we point out evidence that, if a good PPA does not seem to 
impact  market  participants’  decisions,  a  profitable  investment  strategy  may  be  developed 
based on the portion of abnormal goodwill recognized in PPAs. Indeed, predictable cumulated 
abnormal  returns  (hence  potential  mispricing)  can  be  identified  ex  ante,  on  the  basis  of 
abnormal goodwill. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  summarizes  the  related 
literature and develops our research question. Section 3 exhibits our methodology. Section 4 
presents our data. We show and comment our results in section 5. Concluding remarks are 
proposed in section 6. 
2.  Overview of Related Literature 
2.1.  Business  Accounting  Treatment:  Towards  Recognition  of  Intangible 
Assets Separately From Goodwill 
Business  combination  accounting  treatment  has  been  a  very  controversial  case  since  the 
Accounting Principles Board issued APB 16 (AICPA 1970a) and APB 17 (AICPA 1970b), 
respectively dedicated to business combinations and intangible assets. In 2001, FASB clearly 
pronounced itself in favor of the recognition of intangible assets separately from goodwill 










































One  reason  for  promoting  this  orientation  is  clearly  expressed  by  the  IASB  in  2004. 
According to IFRS 3.BC 89, “The Board also agreed with the conclusion reached in IAS 22 
and  by  the  Canadian  and  U.S.  standard-setters  that  the  usefulness  of  financial  statements 
would be enhanced if intangible assets acquired in a business combination were distinguished 
from goodwill.” 
More recently, and within the project of the convergence process with the FASB, the IASB 
stated  that:
 1 “Both  the  IASB  and  the  FASB  decided  that  they  needed  to  provide  explicit 
criteria for determining whether an acquired intangible asset should be recognized separately 
from goodwill. The FASB provided such criteria in SFAS 141 and the IASB provided similar, 
although not identical, criteria in IAS 38.2. One reason for providing such criteria was the 
boards’ conclusion that the decision-usefulness of financial statements would be enhanced if 
intangible assets acquired in a business combination were distinguished from goodwill.” 
Yet, academics as well as practitioners expressed some concerns regarding both usefulness 
and quality of financial statements disclosed by provisions of SFAS 141 and SFAS 141R. 
These concerns may contradict the objective of usefulness targeted by the FASB. 
2.2.  Concerns Expressed 
2.2.1.  Usefulness of Purchase Price Allocations 
Jennings  et  al.  (1996),  Kanodia  et  al.  (2004)  or  Skinner  (2008),  and  some  professional 
investors,
2  support  the  idea  that  information  disclosed  relating  to  intangible  assets  by 
application of accounting standards are not useful to investors. 
Already in 2001, in his report dedicated to strengthening financial markets, Garten (2001, 26) 
casts doubts on the real impact of accounting for intangible assets for equity valuation. He 
points out that “The value of a company is driven by its perceived ability to generate profits 
and cash flow. Intangible assets, by helping companies generate profits and cash flow, are a 
key indirect driver of value. This does not imply, however, that the value of a company’s 
intangible assets translates directly into the value of the company as a whole.” 
Skinner is also not convinced of the usefulness of disclosures pertaining to intangible assets 
for equity valuation. Referring to Holthausen and Watts (2001), Maines et al. (2003, 180) 
                                                           
1 IFRS 3 R BC 158 
2 See the IASB/FASB Joint Board Meeting of the CRUF, 22
nd April, 2008. The CRUF (Corporate Reporting 









































underlines  that  “The  fact  that  voluntary  disclosures  of  intangibles  information  are  not 
widespread suggests that the net private benefits that accrue to firms from these disclosures 
are relatively small.” 
Similarly,  Kanodia  et  al.  (2004)  underline  that  intangible  assets,  even  when  they  are  not 
identified, may be properly valued by financial market. The model suggested by Kanodia et 
al. takes into account concerns of the FASB regarding reliability of the value of intangible 
assets assuming that measurement of intangible is “necessarily noisy.” Kanodia et al. (2004, 
114) point out that “Empirical studies document a positive association between estimated 
intangible investments and stock prices and returns even when the accounting system does not 
explicitly measure and report intangibles.” Nonetheless, they add that “These results do not 
necessarily  imply  that  incorporating  such  estimates  in  formal  accounting  reports  would 
actually provide new information to the market, nor do they imply that an outside observer 
could use these estimates to identify mispriced stocks and earn excess returns in the market.” 
Like  Kanodia  et  al.,  Skinner  (2008)  argues  that  the  main  explanation  of  the  difference 
between the book value and the market value is not the value of unrecognized intangible 
assets: market can value properly intangible assets even when they are not recognized in the 
balance sheet.  
So, the position supported by Kanodia et al. (2004) contrasts with the idea according to which 
“it may appear that even a crude estimate for intangibles would be better than providing no 
information on intangibles.” (p. 91). Actually, in some circumstances, a wrong estimate of 
intangible assets may result in a noise that market will try to undo. This noise may be not only 
useless, but could preclude correct valuation by investors. 
According  to  Kanodia  et  al.,  “intangibles  should  be  measured  only  when  their  relative 
importance in constituting the firm’s capital stock is high and when they can be measured 
with  sufficiently  high  precision.”  We  can  underline  that  this  result  is  consistent  with  the 
position of IFRS 3 (IASB 2004) before its revision in 2008: fair value of intangible assets was 
required to be measured reliably to be accounted for. 
This position has been reversed with the issue of IFRS 3 R (IASB 2008), according to which 
there is a presumption that all intangible assets (and not only intangible assets with a finite 









































Basu and Waymire (2008) also argue that “economic intangibles are cumulative, synergistic, 
and frequently inseparable from other tangible assets and/or economic intangibles not owned 
by any single entity,” and add that “it is usually futile to estimate a separate accounting value 
for individual intangibles.” They cast doubt on the ability to provide meaningful estimate of 
the individual value of intangibles. 
2.2.2.  Quality  Concerns:  Purchase  Price  Allocations  and  Relations  with 
Earnings Management 
In  addition  to  the  usefulness  concerns  highlighted  above,  accounting  for  business 
combinations may favor earnings management behaviors: 
-  before the issue of SFAS 141 in 2001 (FASB 2001a): earnings management consists 
in optimizing the choice of the accounting method (purchase method vs. pooling of 
interest method); 
-  after the issue of SFAS 141 in 2001: earnings management consists in optimizing 
measurement of intangible assets in order to minimize the impact of recognition and 
amortization on subsequent profit and loss statements. 
2.2.2.1.  Purchase Price Allocations and Earnings Management before 2001 
On the one hand, some studies (Browning (1997); McGoldrick (1997); and Hopkins et al. 
(2000))  tend  to  show  that  stock  prices  for  firms  using  purchase  accounting  method  are 
penalized  as  compared  with  those  of  companies  qualifying  combinations  for  the  pooling 
treatment. This impact would be caused by the effect, in the context of purchase method 
application, of goodwill amortization on earnings, despite this amortization has absolutely no 
impact on cash flows generated by the acquirer. As noted by Vincent (1997, 1), “conventional 
wisdom holds that share prices of purchase firms are penalized due to the reduced earnings 
resulting from goodwill amortization.” 
Some authors (e.g., Lys and Vincent (1995)) even reported that firms which succeeded in 
qualifying operation for pooling treatment were willing to pay a higher premium to target’s 









































Ayers  et  al.  (2000)  estimate  that  15%  of  the  premium  paid  in  a  context  of  a  business 
combination is attributable to the possibility for the acquirer to secure a pooling accounting 
treatment. 
Hopkins  et  al.  (2000)  contributed  to  this  case  investigating  the  extent  to  which  analysts’ 
valuation judgments are predictably affected by different methods of accounting for business 
combination. They demonstrate that target prices are negatively impacted by the choice of the 
purchase method. Conversely, target prices are higher if the method chosen is the pooling 
method or the in process R&D method. According to Hopkins et al. (2000), this result can be 
explained by the potential impact of the purchase method on the net income disclosed by the 
acquirer. 
Still, some studies (e.g., Jennings et al. (1996); Vincent (1997), Jenkins (1999)) document that 
market is unlikely to be mistaken by a non-cash impact accounting treatment. Price to be paid 
is  supposed  to  be  the  same  however  favourable  the  accounting  treatment  is  in  terms  of 
financial presentation, consistently with the efficient market hypothesis. According to these 
studies, investors adjust earnings so as to make earnings comparable, whatever accounting 
treatment related to business combinations is chosen by companies. 
Jennings et al. (1996) and Vincent (1997) support this assertion. For example, supporting the 
conventional wisdom described above, research performed by Vincent (1997, 11) provides 
effectively evidence that “pooling firms enjoy an equity valuation advantage over purchase 
firms. There is no consistent evidence, however, relating this advantage to the differences in 
financial reporting.” According to Vincent, “investors value pooling firms more highly, on 
average, than purchase firms in the years immediately following the business combination for 
reasons other than accounting.” 
In addition, Jenkins (1999)
3 points out that amortization of goodwill is a non-cash item and is 
accounted for over a very long period (most of the time, 40 years), reducing the impact of the 
amortization of goodwill on investors’ judgment (see Henning and Shaw (2003)). 
These studies tend to support the idea that “accounting debates are, in fact, arguments about 
nothing,” as noted by Jenkins (1999), “in the sense that nothing in the real world changes just 
because  you slap a different label on it.” According to this position, financial accounting 
options related to business combinations do not provide any useful information to investors. 
                                                           









































Similarly, according to Jennings et al. (1996), if goodwill accounted for (by application of 
purchase  method)  is  effectively  positively  associated  to  the  stock  price  of  the  acquirer, 
relation  between  stock  price  and  amortization  is  very  different  from  a  firm  to  another: 
actually, analysts pay little attention to the selected accounting treatment. 
2.2.2.2.  Purchase Price Allocations and Earnings Management after 2001 
Standard setters acknowledged, in 2008, date of the issue of IFRS 3 revised (IASB 2008), that 
previous  standards  provisions  (IFRS  3)  had  not  been  properly  applied:
4 “Early  in  their 
respective projects on accounting for business combinations, the IASB and the FASB both 
observed that intangible assets make up an increasing proportion of the assets of many (if not 
most)  entities.  The  boards  also  observed  that  intangible  assets  acquired  in  a  business 
combination  were  often  included  in  the  amount  recognized  as  goodwill.”  The  Boards 
acknowledge  that,  until  the  issue  of  SFAS  141  and  IFRS  3,  standards  did  not  meet  the 
objective of reducing the proportion of goodwill accounted for in a context of a business 
combination, and so impacting the quality of financial statements. 
From an academic point of view, some authors (see Shalev (2009, 243-245)) recently pointed 
out that the quality of information disclosed relating to PPAs is actually varying from a firm 
to another. Zhang  and  Zhang (2007) support the idea that the end of pooling  accounting 
method, which occurred after the adoption of FAS 141 in 2001, did not imply the end of the 
controversy neither the end of the interest for this issue. In fact, the debate now focuses on the 
extent to which new standards may exacerbate earnings management, so as to minimize the 
impact of amortization expenses on reported net income. 
This  incentive  to  earnings  management  is  caused  by  the  fact  that  the  end  of  pooling 
accounting  method  (FAS  141,  (FASB  2001a))  is  associated  with  the  end  of  goodwill 
amortization  (FAS  142,(FASB  2001b)).  This  position  results  in  opportunistic  behaviours 
looking to optimize initial purchase price allocation so as to recognize more non-amortizable 
assets than amortizable assets. 
This behaviour would be reinforced by the idea (see  Watts (2003, 215); Ramanna (2008), 
Ramanna and Watts (2009)) that provisions of FAS 142, relating to impairment of goodwill, 
cause  financial  statements  relying  on  unverifiable  value  estimates  and  on  very  subjective 
appreciations. 
                                                           









































Similarly, according to Ball (2006), the quality of the financial statements is largely impacted 
by the margin for manoeuvre which managers benefit to manipulate their financial statements. 
Now, IFRS 3/FAS 141R even offer issuers greater latitude in the opportunistic management 
of operating profits: the characteristics of those assets most concerned by IFRS 3/FAS 141R, 
i.e. intangible assets, often require fair value to be approached by a model in the absence of a 
liquid reference market.  
This opposite effect is already identified by Ball (2006, 23) according to whom: “mark to 
model fair value accounting can add volatility to the financial statements in the form of both 
information  (a  « good »)  and  noise  arising  from  inherent  estimation  error  and  managerial 
manipulation (a “bad ») […] Volatility is an advantage in financial reporting, whenever it 
reflects timely incorporation of new information in earnings, and hence onto balance sheets 
(in  contrast  with  “smoothing,”  which  reduces  volatility).  However,  volatility  becomes  a 
disadvantage to investors and other users whenever it reflects estimation noise or, worse, 
managerial manipulation.” 
The specificity and the complexity of intangible assets explain in part the concerns expressed 
in the literature about the effective usefulness of the information supplied by the financial 
reports on these assets. More precisely, Zhang and Zhang (2007, 38) “predict and find that 
managers allocate more purchase price to goodwill relative to amortizable intangibles [post 
FAS  142]  to  reduce  amortization  expenses.”  They  assert  that  management’s  reporting 
opportunism is a much more relevant driver to purchase price allocation than the underlying 
economics. As a result, managers may, on average, choose to allocate as much part of the 
price as possible to goodwill, considering its non-amortizable accounting treatment. 
This impact of FAS 141 in terms of earnings management may result in providing investors 
with useless information. For instance, Watts (2003, 219) points out that “In moving into 
unverifiable valuation of the firm and non-separable intangible assets, the FASB is taking 
steps down a path that many before them have feared to tread, and with good reason. The 
likely result will be net asset values and earnings that are subject to more manipulation and, 
accordingly, are poorer measures of worth and performance.” 
These reserves expressed with regard to FAS 141 are closed to those relating to FAS 142. For 
instance, according to Ramanna and Watts (2009, 14) “Agency theory predicts managers (all 
else equal) will on average use unverifiability in accounting judgment, such as that in SFAS 









































cannot exclude that the standard is, nevertheless, net beneficial, they highlight “the potential 
costs of unverifiable fair values in SFAS 142.” 
Consequently, issuing standards  requiring separate recognition of intangible from  residual 
goodwill, it seems that standard setters only favored the substitution of an old opportunistic 
behavior in terms of earnings management by a new one.  
Some  professional  users  support  the  same  idea.  For  example,  according  to  the  Corporate 
Reporting  Users’  Forum,
 “The  creation  of  new  intangibles  on  acquisition  (customer  lists, 
brands, developed technology, etc.) is a return to goodwill amortisation by the backdoor but 
(...) it is even more arbitrary (choice of what to capitalise and amortization period is highly 
subjective).” 
2.3.  Research Question 
To solve the current debate between academics and standards setters, we aim at answering the 
following research question: to what extent does the quality of purchase price allocations, 
required by standard setters, make them useful to financial statements users? 
We assume that the quality of PPAs is a good proxy for measurement errors. Hence, we 
answer our research question using a model testing the consequences of measurement errors 
on decisions of market participants. 
3.  Methodology 
We first explain how we estimate the quality of PPAs (paragraph 3.1), and then our approach 
to test the association between our proxy for PPAs’ quality and change in forecasts’ revisions, 
change in dispersion, and change in accuracy (paragraph 3.2). We finally expose our approach 
to assess the potential association between PPAs quality and security mispricing (paragraph 
3.3). 
3.1.  Determining the Quality of Purchase Price Allocations 
The first step of our  approach  aims  at capturing the quality  of  PPAs  by  focusing on the 
amount of abnormal goodwill recognized following a business combination. Consistent with 
the methodology initially developed by Shalev (2009), high quality purchase price allocations 
should generate a level of acquired goodwill consistent with economic fundamentals (e.g., 









































explaining the level of recognized goodwill following business combinations with underlying 
economic  factors.  As  a  result,  similar  to  the  discretionary  accruals  literature  (e.g., 
Subramanyam (1996)), the abnormal portion of recognized goodwill is the residual of the 
model,  i.e.  the  part  that  underlying  economic  factors  do  not  explain.  Abnormal  goodwill 
serves as a proxy related inversely with the quality of the purchase price allocation since 
everything else equal, high quality PPAs should generate less abnormal goodwill. Model (1) 
explains the level of normal goodwill: 
    =   +    ∗              +    ∗      ℎ  +    ∗          +    ∗        + 
   ∗    4  +    ∗         +    ∗       +    
(1) 
Where for firm i: 
•  GWi is the amount of goodwill recognized in the PPA expressed as a percentage of the 
target firm’s total asset (from Acquirers’ 10-Q/K and Compustat); 
•  Materialityi is the purchase price divided by the total assets of the acquiring company 
at the end of the quarter prior to completion of the acquisition (from Thomson One 
Banker and Compustat quarterly); 
•       ℎi  is  the  target  company  growth  potential  measured  as  the  end  of  the  year 
market-to-book ratio of the target (from Compustat annual and CRSP); 
•  Premiumi  is  excess  purchase  price  over  the  market  value  of  equity  of  the  target 
company measured at the end of the month prior to the announcement, expressed as a 
percentage of the market value of equity of the target company (from One Banker and 
CRSP monthly); 
•  Intani  is  the  amount  of  total  intangible  assets  in  the  balance  sheet  of  the  target 
company at the end of the year prior to acquisition (from Compustat annual); 
•  BIG4i = 1 if the auditor of the acquiring company belongs to one of the 4 largest 
external auditors and 0 otherwise (from firm 10-Q/K); 
•  Sectori is a dummy variable controlling sector specific characteristics; 
•  Yeari  is  a  dummy  variable  controlling  the  impact  of  the  year  during  which  the 
purchase price allocation was disclosed. 
εi is the error term in model (1) for firm i. After estimation of (1) the absolute value of 
residuals is labeled abnormal goodwill (AbGW) in the other models presented hereafter and 









































We expect the following relation with the explaining variables: 
•  a negative relation between GW and Materiality could be expected, since the relative 
size and hence visibility of the acquisition could reduce the managers’ willingness to 
recognize a high level of goodwill. However, the relative size of the acquisition could 
capture a potential overpayment, and could inflate the amount allocated to goodwill. 
The expected association is therefore unknown; 
•  a positive relation is expected with Growth, since the growth potential of the target 
company would justify future profits and hence a high level allocated to goodwill;
5 
•  a positive relation is expected between GW and Premium, as high premium paid to 
acquire  a  target  company  may  indicate  an  overpayment  and  increase  the  amount 
allocated to goodwill; 
•  a positive relationship is expected with the amount of intangible assets in the balance 
sheet of the target company prior to acquisition (Intan) as it might be a proxy for the 
quality  of  the  target  company.  Everything  else  equals,  firms  able  to  generate  and 
capitalize intangibles may have higher future profitability, justifying higher amounts 
allocated to goodwill; 
•  a negative relationship is expected between BIG4 and GW as better audit quality could 
lead to more identified intangibles and therefore a smaller recognized goodwill; 
•  finally, the dummies Sector and Years serve as controls for respectively the industry 
and the year. We do not expect any particular relations with GW. 
 
3.2.  Testing the Association between Purchase Price Allocations’ Quality and 
Change of Analysts’ Expectations 
We answer our research question by testing the consequences of the quality of purchase price 
allocations (i.e. the effect of abnormal goodwill) on dependent variables measuring change of 
market expectations for the value of stock prices (change in analysts’ expectations) and direct 
consequences  on  stock  prices  (changes  in  security  prices).  The  second  step  aims  at 
determining the extent to which PPAs are effective and mandatory disclosures required by 
SFAS 141 are effectively  informative  and useful for market participants. Using abnormal 
goodwill, defined as the absolute value of residuals of model (1), as an independent variable, 
                                                           









































we  conduct  three  sets  of  tests  for  analysts’  expectations  and  one  set  of  test  for  market 
expectations as a whole. 
3.2.1.  Association between PPAs’ Quality and Revisions of Analysts’ Expectations 
We examine the impact of the abnormal part of recognized goodwill (proxy for PPA quality) 
on  revisions  of  analyst  expectations  (i.e.  revision  of  target  prices,  earnings  forecasts  and 
recommendations) surrounding the disclosure of purchase price allocation. 
          =   +    ∗       +     (2) 
Where: 
Revisioni is defined as one the following four variables for acquirer i:  
•  RevisionTP is the change in the consensus (mean) target price following disclosure of 
the PPA in percentage of the mean target price before disclosure (from I/B/E/S); 
•  RevisionEBIT  is the change in the EBIT consensus (mean) forecast following disclosure 
of the PPA in percentage of the mean EBIT forecast before disclosure (from I/B/E/S);  
•  RevisionEPS is the change of the EPS forecast (mean) consensus after disclosure in 
percentage of the mean EPS forecast before disclosure (from I/B/E/S);  
•  RevisionRECO is the number of recommendations changed scaled by the total number of 
recommendations made by analysts following disclosure of the PPA (from I/B/E/S); 
•  AbGW is the absolute value of residuals from model (1). 
 
3.2.2.  Assocation between PPAs’ Quality and Change in Forecasts’ Dispersion 
We test the association between the quality of the PPAs and change of analysts’ forecasts 
dispersion with model (3): 
∆            =   +    ∗       +     (3) 
Where ∆            is defined for firm i as the one of the following three variables: 
•  ∆DispEPSi is the change of EPS range following disclosure of the PPA (from I/B/E/S); 










































•  ∆DispTPi is the change of target price range following disclosure of the PPA (from 
I/B/E/S). 
With range is the absolute value of the difference between the most optimistic forecast (or 
target price) and the most pessimistic forecast, scaled by the mean forecast as detailed in 
equations below: 
         =    (
         −       
        
) 
          =    (
          −        
         
) 
        =    (
        −      
        
) 
 
3.2.3.  Assocation between PPAs’ Quality and Change in Forecasts’ Accuracy 
We  also  test  if  analysts’  forecast  accuracy  improves  with  the  quality  of  PPAs  disclosed. 
Model (4) is estimated on our sample: 
∆       =   +    ∗       +     (4) 
Where ∆       is defined for firm i as one of the following two variables: 
•  ∆ErrorEBITi is the change after the disclosure of the PPA of the difference between 
EBIT forecasts and actual EBIT scaled by actual EBIT (from I/B/E/S);  
•  ∆ErrorEPSi is the change after the disclosure of the PPA of differences between EPS 
forecasts and actual EPS scaled by actual EPS (from I/B/E/S). 
We also test the impact of PPA’s quality on target price accuracy as: 
%    =   +    ∗       +     (5) 
Where for firm i: 
•  %  i is the percentage of the target prices hit by the actual security prices over the 










































3.3.  Association between PPAs’ Quality and Cumulated Abnormal Returns 
To further investigate the valuation consequences of PPAs’ quality, we measured cumulated 
abnormal returns by running an event study surrounding PPAs disclosures for 5 portfolios 
containing  an  equal  number  of  companies,  ranked  on  the  basis  of  the  level  of  abnormal 
goodwill  recognized  in  the  PPA.  Portfolio  1  is  composed  of  companies  with  the  lowest 
proportion of abnormal goodwill (top 20% PPAs’ quality) whereas portfolio 5 is compose of 
companies with the highest portion of abnormal goodwill (lowest 20% PPAs’ quality). We 
then compare differences of CARs for the 5 portfolios. 
4.  Data and Sample 
We obtained our sample from the deals analysis database of Thomson One Banker covering 
the period 2002-2008 with the following criteria: 
•  the deal has a value of at least $100 million;
6 
•  both the target and the acquirer are listed US firms; 
•  the deal has been completed; 
•  the target macro-industry is high technology, healthcare, energy and power, or industrial. 
Acquisitions  during  the  period  2002-2008  were  distributed  between  the  different  macro-
industries  as  follows:  finance  (223),  high  technology  (180),  healthcare  (133),  energy  and 
power  (61),  industrials  (56),  materials  (48),  consumer  products  and  services  (43), 
telecommunications (42), real estate (37), media and entertainment (36), consumer staples 
(30), retail (29), and government and agencies (1). We chose to study the 4 macro industries 
with the highest number of deals, excluding the finance sector which has specific disclosure 
requirements. Therefore we hand collected data for high technology, healthcare, energy and 
power, and industrial sectors. 
455 business combinations between 2002 and 2008 met these criteria. Acquirers’ 10-Q or 10-
K reports (depending on the date of acquisition), available from the SEC EDGAR database, 
were examined to obtain the purchase price allocations of these business combinations. The 
purchase price is allocated between current, tangible, and identifiable intangible assets, with 
the  level  of  detail  varying  from  one  firm  to  another.  Due  to  insufficient  and  missing 
                                                           
6 A purchase price in excess of $100 million increases the likelihood of finding relevant data in the acquirer’s 10-
K/Q. Significant acquisitions also increase the likelihood of finding material impact of disclosures related to the 









































disclosures  in  10-Q  and  10-K  reports,  the  final  sample  comprises  approximately  241 
acquisitions with exploitable PPA data. 
We  then  collect  data  to  construct  our  variables  from  CRSP,  Compustat,  and  I/B/E/S  as 
described in section 4. Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics of our sample. 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
From Table 1 Panel A, the mean (median) purchase price represents 3.17 (2.24) times total 
assets of the target companies (Price variable). We can also see that a significant part of the 
purchase price is allocated to goodwill, as the mean (median) recognized goodwill represents 
57% (59%) of the purchase price. Our sample is composed of major acquisitions as the mean 
(median) purchase price represents 33% (23%) of the acquirers’ total assets according to the 
variable Materiality. The sample is composed for 51% of acquisitions in the high tech sector, 
followed by 34% in the healthcare sector, 10% in industrial sector, and 5% of the energy and 
power sector. 
Since variables for some firms are missing our tests are conducted on the largest sample 
available. 
5.  Empirical Results 
5.1.  Determining PPAs’ quality 
In order to determine PPAs’ quality, we estimate model (1) on our sample. Results of the first 
step are displayed in Table 2 below. 
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
From  Table  2,  materiality  of  the  acquisition  increases  the  amount  of  the  purchase  price 
allocated to goodwill, the growth options of the target, as proxied by the market-to-book ratio, 
are  also  positively  associated  with  the  amount  of  recognized  goodwill.  The  amount  of 
separately identified intangibles is positively associated with goodwill. Finally, acquirers in 
the high tech sector seem to recognize more goodwill as compared to the three other sectors. 
The adjusted R² of our model appears satisfying, explaining more than 43% of the variance of 
recognized goodwill. This regression aims to capture the amount of normal goodwill, that is 










































Abnormal goodwill, defined as the absolute value of residuals from model (1), serves as a 
proxy for PPAs quality. 
5.2.  Impact of PPAs’ Quality on Analysts’ Expectations 
In  order  to  test  whether  PPAs’  quality  is  associated  with  dependent  variables  capturing 
change in expectations about firms’ values, we use the proportion of abnormal goodwill as an 
independent variable. We estimate model (2) to (5) to test the impact of the quality of PPAs 
on  analysts’  forecasts  revisions  (model  (2)),  change  in  dispersion  (model  (3)),  change  in 
accuracy (model (4)), and accuracy (model (5)). 
Table 3 (Panel A to D) presents the results of our second step models. 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
From Table 3, a statistically significant negative association is obtained between abnormal 
goodwill and EPS and EBIT revisions (Panel A), and change in target price accuracy (Panel 
D). This would suggest that lower quality (higher abnormal goodwill) leads to lower EPS and 
EBIT revisions and would reduce target price accuracy. No association is observed between 
change in EPS and EBIT forecast dispersion or errors and PPAs’ quality (Panel B and Panel 
C), suggesting that PPAs’ quality is not related to forecast errors or analysts’ accuracy.  
Overall,  from  the  11  tests  we  conduct  to  test  the  impact  of  PPAs’  quality  only  4  are 
statistically significant (at the 10% level). It appears that the quality of PPAs is not completely 
and  systematically  associated  with  change  in  analysts’  expectations,  whether  we  define 
expectations as forecast’s revisions, change in dispersions, change in accuracy, or accuracy of 
analysts. In 7 of our 11 models, PPAs’ quality appears to be unrelated to change in analysts’ 
expectations.  Analysts  do  not  seem  to  fully  consider  the  quality  of  PPAs  to  update  their 









































5.3.  Measuring PPAs’ Quality: Robustness’ Checks 
The  absence  of  association  between  forecasts’  revisions  and  PPAs’  quality  supported  by 
results presented in Table 3 could be explained by the lack of power of our tests, simply 
because we would not have a valid proxy for PPAs’ quality. To assess whether or not our 
variable AbGW is a valid proxy, we conduct two tests: (1) we test if initial PPAs’s low quality 
is associated with subsequent goodwill impairment testing management; (2) we also test if 
PPAs’ quality is correlated with potential earnings management as measured by total accruals. 
5.3.1.  PPAs’ Quality and Subsequent Goodwill Impairment Testing Management 
We hypothesize that low quality PPAs are associated with subsequent goodwill impairment 
testing  management.  The  underlying  rationale  is  that  firms  manipulating  goodwill  initial 
recognition (during the PPA) are also likely to manipulate goodwill impairment tests when 
performance deteriorates during the years following the acquisition. 
To test this hypothesis we estimated the two following models: 
   %      ( ) =   +        +           ∗       +     (6a) 
   %  ( ) =   +        +           ∗       +     (6b) 
Where: 
•  Imp%EBITDA(i) is the total goodwill impairment charge for firm i during the three years 
following completion of the acquisition expressed as a percentage of EBITDA (from 
Compustat annual); 
•  Imp%TA(i) is the total goodwill impairment charge for firm i during the three  years 
following completion of the acquisition expressed as a percentage of three-year mean 
total assets (from Compustat annual); 
•  Perfi is the three-year mean performance of the acquirer measured as EBITDA/Total 
Assets (from Compustat Annual); 
•  LowPerfi  = 1 if firm i is part of the 20% lowest performers of the sample measured as 
EBITDA/Total Assets during the three years following completion of the acquisition 
and = 0 otherwise (from Compustat Annual); 









































Table  1,  Panel  D,  presents  some  descriptive  statistics  of  these  variables  and  shows  that 
goodwill impairments are large as a proportion of EBITDA or total assets. 
We expect LowPerfi *AbGW to be negatively associated with goodwill impairment, i.e. firms 
with low quality PPAs are manipulating future goodwill impairment tests when performance 
deteriorates  and  hence  exhibit  smaller  impairment  charges.  We  also  expect  that  Perfi  is 
negatively associated with goodwill impairment, i.e. higher performance reduces goodwill 
impairment charges. 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
As  expressed  in  Table  4,  Panel  A,  the  estimated  coefficients  are  consistent  with  our 
hypotheses since firms with low performance and low quality PPAs (high level of abnormal 
goodwill)  are  associated  with  lower  future  impairment  charges,  whether  expressed  as  a 
percentage of acquirers’ EBITDA or total assets. 
5.3.2.  PPAs’ Quality and Total Accruals 
We also test if the amount of abnormal goodwill is positively correlated with total accruals. 
The underlying assumption is that firms managing earnings through accruals in their day to 
day financial reporting are also likely to manage earnings through purchase price allocations 
when a business combination occurs. This assumption is expressed in model (7) below: 
      =   +           +     (7) 
Where for firm i: 
•  The variable Accrualsi is the ratio of the absolute value of total accruals to the absolute 
value of cash flow from operations. Total accruals are calculated as follows: (∆ total 
current  assets  –  ∆  Cash)  –  (∆  total  current  liabilities  –  ∆  short  term  debt)  – 
depreciation expense. Cash flow from operation is equal to operating income minus 
total accruals (Burgstahler et al. 2006). 
Table 4, Panel B, presents the results of model (7). 
As total accruals are positively associated with abnormal goodwill, it confirms the validity of 
our proxy for PPAs’ quality. It also constitutes evidence that firms managing earnings through 









































5.4.  Impact of PPAs’ Quality on Security Prices 
To further investigate the impact of the quality of PPAs on market expectations, we run an 
event study centered on the disclosure of the PPA in the acquirer 10-Q/K. If investors do not 
use information contained in PPAs, although they are informative, then it should be possible 
to use PPAs’ quality to form a profitable trading strategy. Indeed, PPAs quality could proxy 
for the quality of the acquisition. 
We divide the initial total sample is into five portfolios based on a ranking of the level of 
abnormal goodwill recognized in the PPAs: portfolio one includes companies that provide the 
top 20% of PPAs’ quality, portfolio two is composed of firms providing the following 20% of 
best PPAs, etc. Portfolio five is contains firms providing the 20% worst PPAs, i.e. 20% of the 
initial sample with the highest level of abnormal goodwill. 
We compute the benchmark returns using the Fama and French (1992) three factors model 
calibrated  on  the  S&P500  on  200  days  ending  32  days  prior  to  the  event  window.  The 
cumulated abnormal returns are then computed during 50 trading days starting two days after 
the disclosure of the purchase price allocation in acquirers’ 10-Q/K reports. 
[Insert Table 5 About Here] 
From Table 5,  Panel A, we can see that firms exhibiting the lowest portion of abnormal 
goodwill (portfolio one) present positive cumulated abnormal returns (+ 2.1% during 50 days, 
representing 10.60% annualized
7), whereas the two portfolios including acquirers with the 
highest portion of abnormal goodwill (portfolio four and five) exhibit negative cumulated 
abnormal returns (respectively -2.83% and -4.36% on 50 days, i.e. resp. -14.15% and -21.80% 
annualized). Additionally, the ranking of CARs for the five portfolios reflects exactly the 
ranking of PPAs’ quality. Figure 1 shows the CAR’ time series after disclosure of PPAs in 
acquirers’ 10-Q/K. 
[Insert Figure 1 About Here] 
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that market participants do not impound the 
information  content  of  PPAs  and  therefore  fail  to  correctly  assess  the  value  of  securities 
following  the  disclosure  of  PPAs.  A  profitable  trading  strategy,  consisting  in  shorting 
                                                           









































acquirers recognizing the highest level of abnormal goodwill and going long on acquirers 
recognizing the lowest level of abnormal goodwill appears to be possible. 
We also computed buy and hold returns over 50 days following the disclosure of PPAs for the 
same five portfolio. As Table 5, Panel B exhibits, acquirers disclosing low quality PPAs lead 
to lower stock returns than acquirers disclosing high quality PPAs. 
6.  Conclusion, Limitations, Discussion for Further Research 
Purchase price allocations (PPAs) following business combinations, mandated by accounting 
standards  (FAS  141  in  the  U.S.,  and  IFRS  3  in  an  international  setting)  require  a  large 
recognition  of  intangible  assets  separately  from  residual  goodwill.  Yet,  this  position  is 
challenged by some academics (e.g., Garten (2001); Kanodia et al. (2004); Skinner (2008); 
Basu and Waymire (2008)) and by some practitioners (e.g.,CRUF (2008)). Indeed, concerns 
are expressed relating to usefulness issues of this requirement, and to quality issues. Earnings 
management behaviors are likely to be exacerbated in the context of a separate recognition of 
intangible assets. 
This paper is the first to investigate the extent to which quality of PPAs, required by standard 
setters, improves financial statements’ usefulness for investors (proxied by analysts or share 
returns) in making economic decisions with regard to capital allocation. 
In order to address this question, and because the quality of work undertaken to conduct PPAs 
is not directly observable, we implemented a two steps approach on a unique hand collected 
data set, consisting of: first, computing a proxy of the quality of works undertaken by a firm 
in the context of PPAs, and second, testing the effects of PPAs’ quality on usefulness of 
financial statements for users (analysts and other market participants). 
We  provide  evidence  that  analysts,  like  the  market  as  a  whole,  do  not  fully  integrate 
information  disclosed  in  PPAs.  However,  we  find  that  PPAs’  quality  has  an  informative 
content, as high quality PPAs are predictably related to stock over performance, whereas 
lower quality’s PPAs are related to future stock underperformance.  
We contribute to the literature in several ways. Our study is the first to test the effects of 
PPAs’ quality for market participants. Hence, our study contributes to standard setters’ works, 
providing  insights  regarding  the  usefulness  of  standards  issued  and  implemented,  and 









































information thanks to a more comprehensive recognition of intangible assets from goodwill
8 – 
is likely to be met. As a result, this paper enters within the scope of the present context much 
more in favor of studies focusing on potential impacts of accounting standards. 
However our study may suffer from a number of limitations. It may be limited by the sample 
we used.  Indeed, we focused on U.S.  firms, from 2002 to 2008. The  results may not be 
generalized to other areas, following international standards for instance. Besides, our proxy 
for PPA’s quality, although robust to some tests, may result in additional limitations: omitted 
variables  may  be  associated  to  normal  goodwill  and  distort  our  conclusions  relating  to 
abnormal goodwill, defined as the residual of our first step approach. 
We suggest to further investigate the extent to which analysts and market as a whole pay 
attention to the informational content of PPAs. Studies could be conducted under an IFRS 
environment, and focus on the evolution over time of the quality of PPAs.   
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Panel A – 1
st Step Variables 
N  Mean  St-dev.  1
st Q  Med  3
rd Q 
Price  265  3.173  2.819  1.429  2.235  3.540 
GW  260  1.813  1.852  0.713  1.193  2.210 
%GW  276  0.572  0.284  0.422  0.589  0.734 
Materiality  278  0.332  0.340  0.093  0.230  0.496 
Intan  265  0.768  1.011  0.205  0.481  0.887 
Growth  250  4.026  6.151  1.751  2.765  4.277 
Premium  251  0.743  2.556  0.238  0.413  0.650 
Accruals  272  -0.003  0.094  -0.033  0.006  0.041 
BIG4  279  0.950         
Health  281  0.338         
Industry  281  0.096         
HighTech  281  0.505         
Nrj  281  0.060         
Price is the purchase price scaled by the total assets of the target firm (from Thomson One Banker and 
Compustat). GW is the amount of the purchase price allocated to goodwill scaled by the total assets of 
the target company (from acquirers’ 10-Q/K and Compustat). %GW is the percentage of the purchase 
price allocated to goodwill (from acquirers’ 10-Q/K A and Thomson One Banker). Materiality is the 
purchase  price  scaled  by  the  total  assets  of  the  acquiring  firm  (from  Thomson  One  Banker  and 
Compustat). Intan is the amount of recognized intangible assets of the target firm scaled by the target 
firm total assets (from Compustat). Growth is the target company growth potential measured as the 
end of the year book-to-market ratio of the target (from Compustat annual and CRSP).         is 
excess purchase price over the market value of equity of the target company measured at the end of the 
month prior to the announcement expressed as a percentage of the market value of equity of the target 
company  (from  One  Banker  and  CRSP  monthly).  Accruals  is  the  acquiring  firm  total  accruals 
measured as indicated in section 5.2. (from Compustat). BIG4 = 1 if the auditor of the acquiring 
company belongs to one of the 4 largest external auditor (from firm 10-Q/K). Health is a dummy 
variable equaling 1 if the acquiring firm macro industry is Healthcare (from Thomson One Banker). 
Industry is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the acquiring firm macro industry is Industrials (from 
Thomson One Banker). HighTech is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the acquiring firm macro industry 
is High Technology (from Thomson One Banker). Nrj is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the acquiring 
firm macro industry is Energy and Power (from Thomson One Banker). 









































Panel B – 2
nd Step Variables (Forecasts’ Revisions and Forecasts’ Accuracy) 
N  Mean  St-dev.  1
st Q  Med  3
rd Q 
RevisionEPS  241  0.117  0.256  0.003  0.031  0.098 
RevisionEBIT  191  0.259  0.716  0.002  0.036  0.192 
RevisionTP  238  0.118  0.251  0.008  0.032  0.076 
RevisionRECO  245  0.043  0.063  0.000  0.018  0.057 
%TP (mean)  233  0.524         
%TP (median)  231  0.519         
RevisionEPS  is  the  change  in  the  consensus  (mean)  EPS  following  disclosure  of  the  PPA  (from 
I/B/E/S); RevisionEBIT is the change in the consensus (mean) EBIT following disclosure of the PPA 
(from I/B/E/S); RevisionTP is the change in the consensus (mean) target price following disclosure of 
the PPA (from I/B/E/S); RevisionRECO the number of recommendations changed scaled by the total 
number of recommendations made by analysts following disclosure of the PPA (from I/B/E/S); %TP 
(mean) is the percentage of the first mean consensus target price after disclosure of the PPA hit by 
actual  security  prices  over  the  next  12  month  (from  I/B/E/S  and  CRSP);  %TP  (median)  is  the 
percentage of the first median consensus target price after disclosure of the PPA hit by actual security 
prices over the next 12 month (from I/B/E/S and CRSP). 
Panel C – 2
nd Step Variables (Dispersion and Forecasts’ Errors) 
N  Mean  St-dev.  1
st Q  Med  3
rd Q 
∆DispEPS   241  -0.012  0.588  -0.040  0.000  0.019 
∆DispEBIT   191  -0.043  0.670  0.000  0.000  0.018 
∆DispTP   222  0.007  0.179  -0.063  0.000  0.037 
∆ErrorEPS  228  -0.020  0.322  -0.039  0.000  0.008 
∆ErrorEBIT   162  -0.123  1.008  -0.053  0.000  0.013 
∆DispEPS is the  change  in EPS range  after  disclosure of the  PPA (from  I/B/E/S); ∆DispEBIT is  the 
change in EBIT range after disclosure of the PPA (from I/B/E/S); ∆DispTP is the change in target price 
range after disclosure of the PPA (from I/B/E/S); ∆ErrorEPS is the change after the disclosure of the 
PPA in the difference between EPS forecasts and actual EPS scaled by actual EPS (from I/B/E/S); 
∆ErrorEBIT is the change after the disclosure of the PPA in the difference between EBIT forecasts and 
actual EBIT scaled by actual EBIT (from I/B/E/S). 
Panel D – PPA and Subsequent Goodwill Impairments 
N  Mean  St-dev.  1
st Q  Med  3
rd Q 
Imp (% EBITDA)  175  0.400  1.337  0.000  0.000  0.097 
ImpTA (% TA)  175  0.072  0.160  0.000  0.000  0.039 
Perf  175  0.116  0.060  0.083  0.116  0.156 
AbGW  157  0.904  0.986  0.308  0.632  0.981 
Imp (% EBITDA) is the cumulated goodwill impairment during the years following completion of the 
acquisition (with a maximum of three years after) as a percentage of three-year cumulated EBITDA. 
ImpTA  (%  TA)  is  the  cumulated  goodwill  impairment  during  years  following  completion  of  the 
acquisition  (with  a  maximum  of  three  years)  as  a  percentage  of  acquirer’s  three-year  mean  total 









































(EBITDA/Total Assets). AbGW is the abnormal goodwill estimated from model (1) measuring the 









































Panel E – Correlation Matrix between 1
st Stage Variables (P-Value are indicated in parenthesis) 
Pricetat  GWtat  GWpc  Materiality  Intant  Growth  Premium  Accruals  BIG4  Health  Industry  HighTech  Nrj 
Pricetat  1.000 
GWtat  0.835  1.000 
(0.000) 
GWpc  -0.042  0.330  1.000 
(0.495)  (0.000) 
Materiality  0.078  0.020  -0.152  1.000 
(0.205)  (0.747)  (0.011) 
Intant  0.699  0.581  -0.101  -0.098  1.000 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.103)  (0.110) 
Growth  0.382  0.395  0.074  -0.066  0.229  1.000 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.246)  (0.295)  (0.000) 
Premium  0.113  0.118  -0.076  -0.022  0.162  -0.039  1.000 
(0.073)  (0.064)  (0.229)  (0.724)  (0.010)  (0.538) 
Accruals  0.014  0.058  -0.001  0.120  0.022  0.041  0.011  1.000 
(0.817)  (0.359)  (0.985)  (0.046)  (0.726)  (0.525)  (0.861) 
BIG4  -0.019  -0.065  -0.023  0.072  -0.051  0.007  0.012  -0.021  1.000 
(0.758)  (0.293)  (0.702)  (0.232)  (0.410)  (0.910)  (0.849)  (0.729) 
Health  0.208  0.023  -0.215  0.138  0.250  0.054  0.020  0.054  -0.077  1.000 
(0.000)  (0.704)  (0.000)  (0.021)  (0.000)  (0.387)  (0.745)  (0.367)  (0.197) 
Industry  -0.126  -0.090  0.110  0.055  -0.094  0.058  -0.032  0.067  0.075  -0.233  1.000 
(0.040)  (0.146)  (0.067)  (0.354)  (0.125)  (0.356)  (0.605)  (0.267)  (0.210)  (0.000) 
HighTech  -0.060  0.099  0.200  -0.191  -0.110  -0.053  0.023  -0.165  0.000  -0.722  -0.329  1.000 
(0.323)  (0.109)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.072)  (0.402)  (0.713)  (0.006)  (0.989)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Nrj  -0.113  -0.137  -0.125  0.059  -0.132  -0.065  -0.050  0.154  0.058  -0.181  -0.082  -0.256  1.000 









































Table 2 – Explanation of Normal Goodwill 
Dep Var:    GW/TA 
Exp. Sign  Coeff.  t-stat  P.Value 
Materiality  (+/-)  0.793**  2.182  0.030 
Growth  (+)  0.089**  2.607  0.010 
Premium  (+)  0.035  1.044  0.297 
Intan  (+)  0.957***  5.657  0.000 
BIG4  (-)  -0.135  -0.277  0.782 
Industry  (+/-)  -0.010  -0.036  0.971 
Nrj  (+/-)  -0.015  -0.047  0.963 
HighTech  (+/-)  0.759***  3.476  0.001 
Two  (+/-)  0.484  0.829  0.408 
Three  (+/-)  0.024  0.078  0.938 
Four  (+/-)  0.358  1.019  0.309 
Five  (+/-)  0.542*  1.774  0.077 
Six  (+/-)  0.225  0.783  0.434 
Seven  (+/-)  0.299  1.064  0.288 
Eight  (+/-)  0.689**  2.166  0.031 
_cons  (+/-)  -0.1646  -0.2617  0.794 
 
R²    0.471 
Adj. R²    0.436 
F    8.163*** 
p(F)    0.000 
N    241 









































Table 3 – Association between PPAs’ Quality and Analysts’ Expectations 
Panel A – Association with Analysts’ Revisions 
Dep Var:  RevisionEPS  RevisionEBIT  RevisionTP  RevisionRECO 
Coeff.  t-stat  P.Value  Coeff.  t-stat  P.Value  Coeff.  t-stat  P.Value  Coeff.  t-stat  P.Value 
abGW1  -0.019*  -1.932  0.055  -0.066*  -1.784  0.076  -0.001  -0.096  0.923  -0.001  -0.251  0.801 
_cons  0.134  5.614  0.000  0.376  4.047  0.000  0.11  4.655  0.000  0.042  6.929  0.000 
R²  0.007  0.006  0.000  0.000 
Adj. R²  0.002  0.000  -0.005  -0.005 
F  3.733*  3.183*  0.009  0.063 
p(F)  0.055  0.076  0.923  0.801 
N  207  166  206  211 









































Panel B – Association of PPA’s Quality with Change of Forecasts’ Dispersion 
Dep Var  ∆DispEPS  ∆DispEBIT  ∆DispTP 
Coeff.  t-stat  P.Value  Coeff.  t-stat  P.Value  Coeff.  t-stat  P.Value 
abGW1  -0.002  -0.183  0.854  -0.016  -1.294  0.197  0.013  0.843  0.400 
_cons  -0.028  -0.769  0.443  0.005  0.399  0.690  -0.006  -0.332  0.740 
R²  0.000  0.012  0.008 
Adj. R²  -0.005  0.006  0.003 
p(F)  0.854  0.197  0.400 
N  207  166  193 
*p<.1 (two-sided tests); **p<.05(two-sided tests); ***p<.01 (two-sided tests) 
Panel C – Association with Change in Forecasts’ Accuracy 
Dep Var:  ∆ErrorEPS  ∆ErrorEBIT 
Coeff.  t-stat  P.Value  Coeff.  t-stat  P.Value 
abGW1  -0.002  -0.184  0.854  0.055  0.843  0.401 
_cons  -0.007  -0.367  0.714  -0.193  -1.343  0.181 
R²  0.000  0.005 
Adj. R²  -0.005  -0.002 
F  0.009  0.996 
p(F)  0.926  0.320 
N  189  136 









































Panel D – Association with Target Prices’ Accuracy after Disclosure 
Dep Var  %TP(mean)  %TP(median) 
Coeff.  t-stat  P.Value  Coeff.  t-stat  P.Value 
abGW1  -0.198**  -2.087  0.037  -0.185*  -1.941  0.052 
_cons  0.245  1.943  0.052  0.219  1.738  0.082 
Pseudo R²  0.016  0.014 
chi2    4.511**      3.889** 
p(chi2)    0.034      0.049 
N  203      201 









































Table 4 – Proxy for PPAs Quality: Robustness’ Checks 
Panel A – Association between PPAs’Quality and Subsequent Goodwill Impairments  
Dep Var    Imp (% EBITDA)  ImpTA (% TA) 
Exp. Sign  Coeff.  t-stat  P.Value  Coeff.  t-stat  P.Value 
AvPerf  (-)  -9.216**  -2.539  0.012  -0.718***  -3.020  0.003 
LowPerf * AbGW  (-)  -0.288*  -1.899  0.059  -0.033**  -2.385  0.018 
_cons  (+/-)  1.566  2.901  0.004  0.163  4.356  0.000 
R²    0.122  0.056 
Adj. R²    0.111  0.043 
F    3.241**  4.748** 
p(F)    0.042  0.01 
N    157  157 
Panel B – Association between PPAs Quality and Total Accruals 
Dep. Var:  AbGW 
Coeff.  t-stat  P.Value 
Accruals**  1.518  2.469  0.014 
_cons  0.965  15.11  0.000 
       
R²  0.019 
Adj. R²  0.015 
F  6.10**     
p(F)  0.014 
N  236 









































Table 5 – Returns Following Disclosure based on Ranking of PPAs’ Quality 
Panel A – Cumulated Abnormal Returns (CAR) based on Quintile of PPA’s Quality (days +2 to +50 after Disclosure) 




Series (CDA) t  p-Value 
Top 20% of PPAs Quality  46  2.12%**  0.869    0.1942 
Top 20% to 40% of PPAs Quality  50  0.38%  0.151    0.4401 
Top 40% to 60% of PPAs Quality  43  -0.41%  -0.156    0.4379 
Top 60% to 80% of PPAs Quality  42  -2.83%  -1.148    0.1255 
Bottom 20% of PPAs Quality  47  -4.36%**  -1.875    0.0304 
*p<.1 (two-sided tests); **p<.05(two-sided tests); ***p<.01 (two-sided tests) 
Panel B – Buy and Hold Returns based on Quintile of PPA’s Quality (days +2 to +50 after Disclosure) 
Portfolio  N 
Mean Buy and Hold 
return 
Median Buy and 
Hold return 
Top 20% of PPAs Quality  46  3.10%  5.94% 
Top 20% to 40% of PPAs Quality  50  6.32%  3.42% 
Top 40% to 60% of PPAs Quality  43  3.63%  2.80% 
Top 60% to 80% of PPAs Quality  42  -0.02%  0.26% 
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